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Harmful comments on social media 
Kathryn Chick 
 
Abstract 
Social media has become a breeding ground for malicious, 
abusive, and offensive communications. These comments when 
posted online can contribute to or cause, inter alia, depression, 
anxiety, and isolation. However, where communications have 
caused harm to others, the restrictive guidelines issued by the 
Crown Prosecution Service can make it difficult to engage the law 
and prosecute the communicator. The justifications for the high 
threshold set are largely associated with protecting the right to 
freedom of expression. This article critically analyses these 
guidelines, arguing that too much protection is afforded to freedom 
of expression at the cost of many harmful comments going 
unchallenged. It is argued that harmful speech posted online 
should not warrant the same protections as other forms of speech 
such as political and intellectual speech. Although not all online 
comments result in harm, and while there are non-legal means to 
deal with unpleasant comments, it should be easier for those 
genuinely harmed to take legal action if necessary. 
 
1! Introduction 
Social media is considered to be one of the greatest revolutions since 
television and is often praised for the benefits it has brought to society 
and to individual users. 1  Its popularity stems from the ‘sense of 
membership, commitment and reciprocity’2 that it offers, as well as its 
 
1 Gavin Sutter, ‘Nothing New Under the Sun: Old Fears and New Media’ (2000) 8 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology 338. 
2 Tony Fitzpatrick, ‘Critical Cyberpolicy: Network Technologies, Massless Citizens, 
Virtual Rights’ (2000) 20(3) Critical Social Policy 375, 382.  
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global reach, which allows access to information and ideas that were 
previously unobtainable.3 However, social media has been recognised 
as a ‘double-edged sword’.4 Despite the positive attributes of digital 
communications, there are drawbacks, including harms that can be 
caused to people in a way that offline communications cannot.  
 
When harmful comments have been posted online, there are two Acts 
under which an offence may have been committed: the Malicious 
Communications Act 1988 (MCA) and the Communications Act 2003 
(CA). Under section 1 MCA, it is an offence to send to another person 
an electronic communication conveying a message that is indecent, 
grossly offensive, threatening or contains information that is known or 
believed to be false. The sender’s purpose, or one of their purposes, in 
sending it must have been to cause distress or anxiety to the recipient 
or to any person to whom they intended its content to be 
communicated.5 Under section 127 CA, a person is guilty of an offence 
if he ‘sends by means of a public electronic communications network a 
message or other matter that is grossly offensive or of an indecent, 
obscene or menacing character’. It is also an offence under this 
provision to send a message known to be false using a public, electronic 
communications network for the purpose of causing annoyance, 
inconvenience or needless anxiety to another person.6 
 
However, before a person can be prosecuted under the MCA or CA, the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) must decide whether to proceed with 
the case. In order to prevent inappropriate or unmeritorious 
prosecutions, the CPS established guidelines to regularise its treatment 
of these cases. 7  This article focuses on the CPS Guidelines on 
 
3 Peter Coe, ‘The Social Media Paradox: An Intersection with Freedom of Expression 
and the Criminal Law’ [2015] Information & Communications Technology Law 16. 
4  Maya Hertig Randall, ‘Freedom of Expression in the Internet’ (2016) 26 Swiss 
Review of International and European Law 235, 247. 
5 MCA 1988, s 1(b). 
6 CA 2003, s 127(2). 
7 Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (4th edn, OUP 2010) 
ch 7. 
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Prosecuting Cases Involving Communications Sent via Social Media 
(CPS Guidelines or the Guidelines).8  
 
The CPS Guidelines impose a high threshold for prosecuting cases 
under section 1 MCA or section 127 CA, which has been justified 
because of the importance of safeguarding the right to freedom of 
expression. Freedom of expression is a human right protected under 
Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights, incorporated 
into domestic law via the Human Rights Act 1998. Article 10 provides 
that everyone has the freedom to hold opinions and receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority.9 It is a 
qualified right which can be restricted where prescribed by law and 
where such restrictions are necessary in a democratic society for the 
protection of inter alia the reputation or rights of others.10 As the CPS 
affords significant protection to freedom of expression, prosecution is 
rendered unlikely in many circumstances, resulting in the potential for 
some meritorious cases going unchallenged.  
 
This article discusses whether the CPS Guidelines have struck the right 
balance between freedom of expression and protection from harmful 
communications on social media. Section 1 explains what the CPS 
Guidelines set out and what constitutes ‘harmful comments’ online. 
Section 2 critically analyses the CPS Guidelines, and raises issues with 
the current balance between freedom of expression and protection from 
harm. Section 3 demonstrates that the justifications for freedom of 
expression do not apply to harmful comments posted online and 
therefore should not be given such significant weight in the CPS 
Guidelines. Section 4 considers why freedom of expression on social 
media can be more harmful than face-to-face communication, 
 
8  Director of Public Prosecutions, ‘Guidelines on Prosecuting Cases Involving 
Communications Sent Via Social Media’ (2013) CPS 
<http://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2013-
1025/social_media_guidelines.pdf> accessed 15 October 2018.  
9 Human Rights Act 1998, sch 1, art 10(1). 
10 ibid art 10(2). 
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explaining why protection of harm should be given more weight than 
freedom of expression in the CPS Guidelines.  
2! The definition of harm and CPS guidelines 
The CPS Guidelines for prosecuting harmful communications that have 
been posted on social media centre around a notion of harmful 
communications. This section explores the legal definition of harmful 
communications and their treatment by the Guidelines. 
2.1! Harm 
Leading academic Joel Feinberg defines harmful conduct as that which 
interferes with a person’s interests.11 Feinberg believes that a person’s 
most important interests are their ‘welfare interests,’ which include 
inter alia, physical and psychological wellbeing, emotional stability 
and the ability to engage in normal social intercourse.12 Some argue that 
online communication could not possibly lead to harm, and that the 
potential harm flowing from speech is less significant than the danger 
from action, 13 or that speech can only be harmful if it leads to action 
which causes harm, such as inciting violence. 14  As Feinberg 
recognised, various experiences can cause distress, offence or irritation 
without precluding any welfare interests. 15  Wounded pride, hurt 
feelings, anger, embarrassment, and shame are all feelings of the 
moment that will pass, and cannot be classed as harms.16  
 
It is accepted that comments made to an individual online can cause 
temporary emotions, which need not be dealt with by law as they are 
not necessarily harmful. However, if one becomes so consumed with 
 
11 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 1: Harm to Others 
(OUP 1987) ch 1. 
12 ibid 37.  
13 Martin H. Redish, ‘Self-Realisation, Democracy, and Freedom of Expression: A 
Reply to Professor Baker’ (1981–82) 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 678. 
14 K.C. O’Rourke, John Stewart Mill and Freedom of Expression: The Genesis of a 
Theory (Routledge 2001). 
15 Feinberg (n 11). 
16 ibid.  
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feelings of offence or otherwise, to the extent that their welfare interests 
have been precluded, that ought to be considered harmful and the law 
should intervene. 17  Thus, for the purposes of this article, harmful 
comments are those posted online that have the effect of precluding a 
person’s welfare interests. 
2.2! CPS guidelines  
To decide whether online comments should be prosecuted, the CPS 
follows its two-stage Full Code Test. First is the evidential stage, which 
requires there to be enough evidence to provide a realistic prospect of 
conviction. 18  If a case does not have sufficient evidence, the 
prosecution must not go ahead. 19  Second, the prosecution must be 
necessary in the public interest. For this stage, things to consider 
include the seriousness of the offence committed, the culpability of the 
suspect, the circumstances of and the harm caused to the victim, the 
suspect’s age and maturity at the time of the offence, the impact on the 
community, and whether prosecution is a proportionate response.20 If 
these stages are satisfied, then a prosecution can commence. 
 
As regards communications sent via social media, the CPS has 
categorised four different types of communication that could be 
prosecuted: 
 
1.! communications that may constitute credible threats of 
violence or damage to property;  
2.! communications that specifically target an individual(s) which 
may constitute stalking or harassment;   
3.! communications that may be a breach of a court order; or  
4.! communications that do not fall into any of the categories 
 
17 ibid. 
18 CPS, ‘About CPS’ <https://www.cps.gov.uk/about-cps> accessed April 2019. 
19 ibid. 
20 CPS, ‘The Code for Crown Prosecutors’ 
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-prosecutors> accessed April 2019, 
para 4.8. 
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above, which may be considered grossly offensive, indecent, 
obscene or false.21 
 
As this article discusses harmful communication that could be 
prosecuted under the MCA or CA, it focuses on the fourth category.  
 
The CPS Guidelines dictate that at the evidential stage, cases that fall 
under this fourth category are to be subjected to a ‘high threshold’ and 
that ‘prosecution is unlikely to be in the public interest.’22 This implies 
that the CPS has little concern for the harm that certain online 
comments can cause. This high threshold is justified on the basis that a 
lower threshold would give rise to a floodgate of trivial cases,23 and 
would create the potential for a chilling effect on freedom of expression. 
Prosecutors are advised to ‘exercise considerable caution before 
bringing charges’ under section 1 MCA and section 127 CA. 24 
Furthermore, the CPS states that ‘the age and maturity of suspects 
should be given significant weight, particularly if they are under the age 
of 18’.25 Therefore, the CPS affords significant protection to freedom 
of expression and it is unlikely that many cases under the fourth 
category will satisfy the Full Code Test.  
 
However, this article argues that there is a marked difference between 
expressing views strongly and deliberately setting out to cause harm.26 
Too much weight has been given in favour of freedom of expression, 
leading to harmful comments going unchallenged.  
 
21  Director of Public Prosecutions, ‘Guidelines on Prosecuting Cases Involving 
Communications Sent Via Social Media’ (2013) CPS 
<http://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2013-
1025/social_media_guidelines.pdf> accessed October 2018. 
22 ibid para 13. 
23 ibid para 33.  
24 ibid para 34. 
25 ibid para 46.  
26 Graeme Broadbent, ‘Malicious Communications Act 1988: Human Rights’ (2007) 
71 Journal of Criminal Law 288. 
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3! Justifying the current CPS guidelines 
This section interrogates the justifications put forward by the CPS in 
support of their guidelines. It questions whether these justifications 
warrant the current restrictive policy adopted vis-à-vis prosecuting 
harmful communications.  
3.1! The floodgate argument 
The CPS Guidelines justify the high threshold for prosecuting alleged 
offences under section 1 MCA or section 127 CA on the basis that to 
do otherwise would lead to a flood of cases due to the millions of 
messages sent on social media every day.27 The floodgate argument is 
the notion that certain cases should not be prosecuted because to do so 
would ‘swamp the courts with [future] litigation.’28 Undoubtedly, not 
all instances of unpleasant expression online have caused the readers 
harm, and they should not all be taken to court. 29  
 
However, it is not inevitable that a lower threshold for prosecution 
would lead to a floodgate of cases. There are avenues other than court 
which are used to resolving issues on social media, such as blocking or 
reporting. Blocking someone often prohibits that person from 
contacting you in any way or viewing your posts, 30  and reporting 
comments to the social networking site provides a channel for possible 
removal.31 These are widely used tools, as 46% of girls aged 11–21 
would report offensive behaviour online to the social media site.32 
 
27 Director of Public Prosecutions (n 21) para 33. 
28 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth 1977) 100.  
29 HM Government, Internet Safety Survey Green Paper (2017).  
30 Facebook, ‘Unfriending or Blocking Someone’  
 <https://www.facebook.com/help/1000976436606344?helpref=hc_global_nav> 
accessed April 2019.  
31 Facebook, ‘How to Report Something’ <https://en-
gb.facebook.com/help/263149623790594/> accessed April 2019. 
32 Girlguiding, ‘Girls’ Attitudes Survey’ (2018) 
<https://www.girlguiding.org.uk/globalassets/docs-and-resources/research-and-
campaigns/girls-attitudes-survey-2018.pdf> accessed April 2019, 4. 
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Therefore, it cannot be claimed with certainty that a lower threshold 
would lead to a flood of cases.  
  
Nonetheless, to deny prosecution on this basis seems unfair. As noted 
by Gur, the floodgate argument ignores the conduct of the alleged and 
ignores the harm caused to the victim.33 It also ignores the merits of a 
case.34 Instances of harmful communication could go unchallenged as 
a result of this. The floodgate principle underpinning the CPS 
Guidelines fails to adequately consider the potential for harm to be 
suffered by online readers. 
3.2! Chilling effect on speech 
The CPS Guidelines stress that a lower threshold for prosecuting cases 
under section 1 MCA and section 127 CA could lead to a potential 
chilling effect on speech. Coe suggests that if speech online is not 
protected, it could impede the dissemination of information. 35 
Similarly, Stein argues that users may stop expressing their opinions 
and beliefs online or may even stop using the sites altogether for fear of 
being prosecuted.36  
 
However, these arguments are flawed. As social media has become a 
key instrument for communication today, it is unlikely that people 
would stop using it altogether.37 Furthermore, social media exists to 
encourage people to become more open and connected with the world 
and to share ideas with others.38 It would be a positive outcome if 
 
33 Noam Gur, ‘Ronald Dworkin and the Curious Case of the Floodgates Argument’ 
(2018) 31(2) Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 323. 
34 ibid. 
35 Coe (n 3).  
36 Bethany Stein, ‘A Bland Interpretation: Why a Facebook Like should be Protected 
First Amendment Speech’ (2014) 44 Seton Hall Law Review 1255.  
37 Ian J Lloyd, Information Technology Law (8th edn, OUP 2017).  
38 Kathleen Chaykowski, ‘Mark Zuckerberg Gives Facebook A New Mission’ 
(Forbes, 22 June 2017) 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/kathleenchaykowski/2017/06/22/mark-
zuckerberg-gives-facebook-a-new-mission/#c5891b91343b> accessed 
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harmful comments online were deterred.  
 
Expression has certainly been restricted in other areas of law. For 
instance, the ProLife Alliance39 case concerned the BBC refusing to 
show a broadcast on television because it contained graphic images of 
abortion. The House of Lords claimed that the reference to ‘rights of 
others’ under Article 10(2) is capable of including the sense of outrage 
felt by the public who ‘in the privacy of their own homes had turned on 
the television … and been confronted by gratuitously offensive 
material.’ 40  Thus, in other areas of law, speech or other forms of 
expression which are likely to have a negative impact on the recipient 
have been deterred by the threat of punishment. It therefore follows that 
comments posted on social media that have harmful effects on the 
reader should also be deterred. The CPS Guidelines ought to lower the 
threshold and have less concern for the chilling effect on speech and 
more consideration for victims of harmful online communications.  
3.3! Public interest 
The CPS Guidelines state that comments posted on social media are 
unlikely to be in the public interest. In fact, the Law Commission noted 
that a significant proportion of prosecutions under section 1 MCA and 
section 127 CA are linked to communications targeting high-profile 
figures. 41  Recently, there has been an increase in Members of 
Parliament (MPs) receiving harmful comments on social media. For 
example, in 2018 MP Jess Phillips received over 600 rape threats on 
Twitter.42 Whilst these cases are rightly being prosecuted, the CPS is 
wrong to consider that mainly cases involving victims in the public eye 
 
March 2019.  
39 R (ProLife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation [2003] UKHL 23. 
40 ibid [91]. 
41 Law Commission, Abusive and Offensive Online Communications: A Scoping Report 
(Law Com No 381, 2018) [5.74].  
42 Kevin Rawlinson, ‘Labour MP Calls for End to Online Anonymity After 600 Rape 
Threats’ The Guardian (London, 2018) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/jun/11/labour-mp-jess-phillips-calls-for-
end-to-online-anonymity-after-600-threats> accessed 5 March 2020. 
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are worthy of prosecution. With 88% of people in Great Britain 
online,43 anyone has the potential to be harmed on social media,44 not 
just public figures.  
 
Significant harm can be caused to victims by online comments, and it 
should be a matter of public interest to protect these victims, no matter 
who they are.45 Certain comments are capable of causing psychological, 
emotional, and social harm, which may increase feelings of depression, 
isolation, and anxiety.46 In adults this can cause them to miss work;47 
likewise, children might stop attending school.48 This could have long-
lasting impacts on an individual as it could affect their livelihood or 
education.49 The psychological impacts of harmful online comments 
can be so profound that people as young as 12 years old have committed 
suicide following such incidents.50 This demonstrates just how serious 
an impact harmful online comments can have on a victim’s mental 
wellbeing.51 
 
It follows that the CPS is wrong to claim that prosecution is unlikely to 
 
43  Office for National Statistics, ‘Adults’ Media Use and Attitudes Report’ [2018] 
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/113222/Adults-Media-Use-
and-Attitudes-Report-2018.pdf > accessed April 2019, 109. 
44 HM Government (n 29). 
45 Krupa Patel, ‘Cyberbullying: What’s the Status in England?’ (2012) 13 San Diego 
International Law Journal 589. 
46 Cybersmile, ‘How Is Cyberbullying Different from Traditional Bullying?’ (2014) 
<https://www.cybersmile.org/blog/how-is-cyberbullying-different-from-traditional-
bullying> accessed February 2019. 
47  Robin Kowalski and others, ‘Bullying and Cyberbullying in Adulthood and the 
Workplace’ (2018) 158(1) Journal of Social Psychology 64. 
48 Patel (n 45). 
49 Sally Kift and others, ‘Cyberbullying in Social Networking Sites and Blogs: Legal 
Issues for Young People and Schools’ (2009) 20(2) Journal of Law, Information and 
Science 60. 
50 Cybersmile, ‘12-Year-Old Cyberbullying Victim Posted RIP on Social Media Before 
Taking Her Own Life’ (Cybersmile 2019) <https://www.cybersmile.org/news/12-year-
old-cyberbullying-victim-posted-rip-on-social-media-before-taking-her-own-life> 
accessed April 2019.  
51 Patel (n 45) 594. 
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be in the public interest as harms flowing from harmful comments can 
be catastrophic. It should be considered a matter of public interest to 
ensure that social media is not used to harm others and that, where harm 
has been caused, prosecution is available. 
3.4! Age of the sender 
The CPS Guidelines state that significant weight should be given to the 
age and maturity of the sender, particularly those under the age of 
eighteen. This is justified on the grounds that ‘children may not 
appreciate the potential harm and seriousness of their 
communications’.52 Thus, the CPS has tilted the scales further in favour 
of the rights of young persons to freedom of expression. However, it is 
contended that young people should be held responsible where their 
online comments have intentionally caused harm. 
 
The age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales is 10,53 and 
therefore when contemplating whether to prosecute a young person 
between the ages of 10 and 18, the CPS ought to recognise their 
capability to accept criminal responsibility for their actions. It is 
accepted that many people under 18 will send messages online that are 
not intended to harm the recipient and that merely cause them to feel 
temporary emotions of sadness, embarrassment or shame inter alia. As 
previously argued, this sort of speech should not be prosecuted. 
However, under 18s are capable of intending to cause harm to the 
recipient. For example, a high school student in America wanted to 
publicise his hatred towards his school teachers and created a website 
dedicated to them.54 The website was titled ‘Teacher Sux’ with profane 
comments and pictures posted relating to the teachers, including a 
picture of one teacher’s decapitated head with blood dripping down her 
neck. 55  Furthermore, the website invited visitors to donate money 
 
52 Director of Public Prosecutions (n 21) para 46.  
53 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 34. 
54  Renee Servance, ‘Cyberbullying, Cyber-harassment, and the Conflict Between 
Schools and the First Amendment’ [2003] Wisconsin Law Review 1213.  
55 ibid. 
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towards paying a hit man to kill one of the teachers.56 This exhibits the 
potential harms associated with online communication by under 18s 
and explains why the CPS Guidelines ought to be less considerate to 
young people who intentionally and successfully harm others online.  
 
Having considered how the CPS’s justifications for a high threshold are 
disputable, this article will now discuss the rationale underpinning the 
current protections offered to the right to freedom of expression by the 
CPS.   
4! Freedom of expression on social media 
As the CPS Guidelines give significant weight to freedom of expression 
on social media, this section will critically analyse the Article 10 right 
justifications. It demonstrates why harmful comments posted online 
should not be protected by the right to freedom of expression and 
establishes why the CPS ought to reconsider the balance it has struck 
between freedom of expression and protection from harm. To do so, the 
justifications for freedom of expression, as laid out by Lord Steyn in ex 
p Simms,57 are critically analysed in turn.  
4.1! The right to freedom of expression 
For years, freedom of expression has been regarded as a right which 
carries ‘high importance’58 as the cornerstone of a free society.59 These 
beliefs have survived for centuries and, as a consequence, freedom of 
expression is now considered to be a fundamental human right as per 
Article 10 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Article 10 protects most 
forms of speech, including ‘those that offend, shock or disturb the State 
or any section of the population.’60 Nonetheless, not all forms of speech 
are afforded equal levels of protection. 
 
56 ibid. 
57 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 126.  
58 Reynolds v Times Newspapers [2001] 2 AC 127, [200].  
59 Stephen Gard, ‘Book Review – Defending My Enemy: American Nazis, the Skokie 
Case, and the Risks of Freedom’ (1981) 32 Hastings Law Journal 711. 
60 Handyside v United Kingdom [1976] EHRR 737, [49].  
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4.2! Hierarchy of speech 
Over time, European and domestic courts have developed a hierarchy 
of speech,61 distinguishing between political, educational, and artistic 
expression.62 At the pinnacle of the hierarchy lies political speech.63 As 
Scott LJ stated in Lyon v Daily Telegraph, ‘it is in the public interest to 
have a free discussion of matters of public interest.’64 An additional 
benefit for affording greater protection to political speech is that it ‘is a 
basic safeguard against irresponsible political power’.65 The increased 
value of political speech was recognised in Campbell v MGN whereby 
the dissemination of information concerning Naomi Campbell’s drug 
addiction was found to be ‘of a lower order than … political 
information’.66 Lady Hale went on to state that below political speech 
sits educational speech due to its ability to help individuals play their 
‘full part in society and in our democratic life’.67 Both political and 
educational speech would fall under media law, and freedom of 
expression expert Rowbottom’s category of ‘high-value’ speech. 
Rowbottom has carried out extensive research on freedom of 
expression online in the past decade, providing this article with a 
modern typology to refer to.68 High-value speech is distinguishable for 
being professionally produced, aimed at a wide audience and/or well 
researched in advance.69  
 
Further down the hierarchy lies commercial and artistic expression, 
which is afforded much less protection.70 And finally, at the bottom lies 
 
61 Mark Elliot and Robert Thomas, Public Law (3rd edn, OUP 2017) 843. 
62 Campbell v MGN Limited [2004] UKHL 22, [148]. 
63 ibid [148]. 
64 Lyon v Daily Telegraph [1943] KB 746, [752].  
65 J G Fleming, The Law of Torts (9th edn, Law Book Company 1998) 648.  
66 Campbell (n 62) [29]. 
67 ibid [148]. 
68 University of Oxford, ‘Jacob Rowbottom’ <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/people/jacob-
rowbottom> accessed January 2020.  
69  Jacob Rowbottom, ‘To Rant, Vent and Converse: Protecting Low Level Digital 
Speech’ (2012) 71(2) Cambridge Law Journal 355. 
70 Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (2nd edn, OUP 
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offensive, hurtful, and indecent speech, which is seldom protected.71 It 
is suggested that these forms of speech be grouped under Rowbottom’s 
‘low-level expression’, which is defined as amateur, spontaneous, 
inexpensive to produce and often akin to everyday conversation.72 As 
section 127 CA concerns speech that is grossly offensive, indecent, or 
menacing and section 1 MCA covers speech that is grossly offensive, 
indecent, threatening or false, the speech on which this article is centred 
constitutes low-level expression.  
4.3! Justifications for freedom of expression 
Having established the hierarchy of different forms of speech, the next 
part of this paper critically analyses the main justifications for freedom 
of expression. It is argued that these justifications are only applicable 
to high level speech and thus, low-level speech should be restricted 
where it causes harm to the recipient.  
 
(A)!Autonomy and self-development 
 
Freedom of expression has been justified on the grounds that it helps 
the autonomy and self-development of individuals; 73  one argument 
being that hearing a range of ideas and opinions can help to educate and 
improve knowledge.74 This aligns with Mill’s view that freedom of 
expression exists primarily for the sake of the hearer.75 For Mill, it is 
not the act of expressing one’s thoughts that carries value, but the need 
for people to hear a variety of opinions, in order to achieve their own 
genuine thoughts and individualism.76 Furthermore, Redish argues that 
without free speech, persons could not reach their full intellectual 
potential.77  
 
2000) [15].  
71 Rowbottom (n 69). 
72 ibid. 
73 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 16. 
74 ibid. 
75 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1st edn JW Parker & Son 1859). 
76 O’Rourke (n 14).  
77 Redish (n 13). 
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Though the ability to express oneself freely is important in order to 
educate the masses, it is likely that only high-level speech is going to 
provide valuable knowledge. As stated by Lady Hale, intellectual and 
educational speech is only important for giving individuals the 
‘potential to play a full part in society and in our democratic life’.78 
Thus, only speech that is political or otherwise in the public interest will 
lead to an individual’s development of knowledge. It follows that 
harmful speech posted online, such as comments or posts that bully, 
harass, or cause distress to the reader, should not be justified on this 
basis.  
 
In a similar vein, but in juxtaposition to Mill’s belief that freedom of 
expression is for the sake of the hearer, Feldman argues that freedom of 
expression is for the sake of the speaker: it enables freedom of 
conscience, personal identity, and self-fulfilment.79 Greenwalt submits 
that to suppress communication is the most serious impingement on our 
personalities compared to any other restraint on liberty.80  
 
Some have argued that all communication, including poor taste jokes 
and offensive comments, can be justified as they allow the speaker to 
choose how to present themselves to society.81 Although an opinion 
may be considered ‘wrong’ by the majority, it is important to protect 
expression that is unpopular. Society has a right to try to convince 
people that certain beliefs are flawed, but should not attempt to prevent 
their expression.82 In fact, the law currently defends expression which 
the majority consider wrong or offensive, and this article agrees that 
speech which is merely unpopular but not harmful should not be 
prosecuted. 
 
 
78 Campbell (n 62) [148]. 
79 David Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (2nd edn, 
OUP 2002). 
80 Kent Greenwalt, From the Bottom Up: Selected Essays (OUP 2016) 377. 
81 Rowbottom (n 69).  
82 O’Rourke (n 14). 
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(B)!Discovery of truth 
 
The right to freedom of expression is often justified on the basis that it 
leads to the discovery of the truth.83 In order for something to be ‘true’, 
it must be accurate and in accordance with fact or reality.84 For Mill, 
the only way to discover the truth is to weigh all competing opinions 
against each other.85 Gordon refers to this as the ‘marketplace of ideas,’ 
whereby all opinions and thoughts are exchanged, pushing out bad 
ideas and allowing good ones to thrive.86 It is believed by some that it 
is only from the free competition of ideas that the truth can genuinely 
emerge.87 This is not to say that opinions which are bad or false are to 
be suppressed, because to do so would be to assume infallibility.88 
Instead, the free marketplace of ideas should incorporate all opinions, 
which people can discuss with each other and determine for themselves 
whether an opinion is pernicious or false. 89  
 
One benefit of the marketplace of ideas is that it continues to make room 
for new opinions. There is no such thing as an ‘objective truth,’90 as 
what is considered to be factual or reality is changing constantly.91 New 
discoveries are leading to realisations that what was once considered to 
be true is now, in fact, false. 92  For example, smoking was once 
considered to be healthy. This is supported by Emerson who contends 
 
83 C Edwin Baker, ‘Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech’ [1978] 25 
UCLA Law Review 964. 
84  Oxford Dictionary, ‘Truth’ <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/truth> 
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that there is no way of suppressing the false without also suppressing 
the true.93  
 
The truth justification is not only popular amongst philosophers and 
academics, but also judges and lawmakers. For instance, section 2 of 
the Defamation Act 2013 provides a truth defence whereby expression 
that has significantly harmed one’s reputation can be justified because 
it was true. To uncover to the world something of which it was 
previously ignorant is, for Mill, an extremely important service one 
human can provide for their fellow persons.94 However, it is submitted 
that the justification of truth should only be applicable in situations 
where the speech involved is high level, in order to unveil something 
which is in the public interest.   
 
Low-level speech – including offensive or harmful expression directed 
at an individual, especially one who is not a public figure – should not 
be defended on the basis of truth. For example, in 2010 Tyler Clementi 
committed suicide after his roommate filmed him having sex with a 
man and uploaded it online, stating he was gay.95 The fact that the 
roommate’s comments were based on his own observations and 
perception should not justify him expressing them. The harm caused by 
some low-level (offensive or hurtful) speech makes the value of their 
truth worthless. Thus, this justification should not be applicable to 
harmful speech directed at individuals and accordingly, the CPS should 
give less weight to freedom of expression in such cases.  
 
 
 
 
93  Thomas Emerson, ‘The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press’ (1979) 14 
Harvard Civil Rights Civil Liberties Law Review 329.  
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95 Ed Picklington, ‘Tyler Clementi, Student Outed as Gay on Internet, Jumps to his 
Death’ The Guardian (London, 2010) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/30/tyler-clementi-gay-student-
suicide> accessed October 2018.  
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(C)!Democracy 
 
Freedom of expression is considered the ‘cornerstone of the survival of 
democratic society’.96 This is reflected in Article 10(2), which states 
freedom of expression can only be restricted if, inter alia, it is necessary 
in a democratic society.97 For Gard, the only thing that separates a free 
society from others is the unrestricted flow of ideas, including those 
which are hateful and those which are hurtful. 98  Such liberty of 
expression can be justified as a means of maintaining stability in 
society.99 There is more likely to be resentment and rebellion if people 
cannot present their opinions. 100  Emerson believes that suppressed 
groups would be forced underground, making them even more 
dangerous to society.101 This is certainly true for high-level political 
speech, as democracy requires that individuals employ their thoughts 
and opinions in making political choices.102  
 
More specifically, the argument of democracy is used to justify freedom 
of expression online. Social networking sites have become the medium 
for communication and it is therefore imperative that users’ opinions 
are constitutionally protected. 103  With magazines, blogs, and 
newspapers now posting on social media, it has become an ‘information 
superhighway’,104 creating a platform where the expression of political 
opinions and information are being engaged in by people who would 
otherwise be apathetic.105 This is beneficial for a democratic society 
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because a better informed citizenry may yield a better system of 
government and more deliberative political decision-making 
processes.106 Even political figures have social media accounts which 
anyone can access and comment on. This is an extremely positive 
aspect of freedom of expression on social media, as it encourages 
uninhibited, vigorous, and wide-open expression on public issues.107 
Thus, the justification of democracy is applicable to high-level political 
speech.  
 
However, the democracy argument should not justify harmful 
comments on social media, even if directed at a public figure. For 
example, in 2014 a journalist’s feminist campaign resulted in harmful 
online comments directed at her.108 One person tweeted ‘you should 
have jumped in front of horses, go and die.’109 The democracy argument 
should not apply here as the expression had little relation to politics, 
culture, or social values, and the person who tweeted that was rightly 
prosecuted for the harm suffered by the recipient.110 Therefore, harmful 
speech should not be protected by the CPS on the basis of democracy.  
 
Having explained why harmful comments online are unjustifiable, this 
article shall now demonstrate why protection from harm ought to be 
given more consideration by the CPS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 Greenwalt (n 80). 
107 Gard (n 59).  
108 Andrew Murray, Information Technology Law: The Law and Society (3rd edn, OUP 
2016) ch 7. 
109 ibid. 
110 ibid. 
102 
 
 York Law Review 
5! Protecting users from harm in social media 
Some believe that as there is no imminent risk of physical harm, online 
communications cannot be as harmful as offline communications.111 
However, this section demonstrates how certain unique characteristics 
of social media give it the potential to amplify the impact of low-level 
speech on the recipient. Thus, speech that would cause temporary 
emotions face-to-face can cause significant harm if posted online. This 
section will conclude that the CPS should take more seriously the fact 
that social media is utilised by some to harm others and that the 
Guidelines ought to shift in favour of prosecuting those who do so. 
5.1! Anonymity 
One of the most fundamental, powerful characteristics of online 
communication is anonymity.112  On the internet, people are able to 
assume different personas and use various pseudonyms in order to mask 
their true identities.113 For some, anonymity is a very positive aspect of 
the online world. Strossen maintains that without the ‘cloak of 
anonymity, many individuals [would] not exercise their right to 
freedom of expression.’114 Anonymity encourages speakers to share 
their genuine ideas and opinions, which can be done more liberally if 
people know that they cannot be identified.115 In a similar vein, Randall 
has argued that anonymity is ‘a shield from the tyranny of the 
majority.’116  
 
On the other hand, Patel observes that anonymity is the most ‘fearful’ 
characteristic of online communications. 117  Anonymity can also be 
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used as a sword with the intent to cause harm to others. For example, 
Ask.fm is an anonymous ‘questions and answers’ website; at least four 
teenagers who were subject to abusive comments on Ask.fm have 
committed suicide.118 This suggests that anonymity can make online 
communications extremely harmful can contribute to the many factors 
which lead a person to commit suicide.  
 
The psychological injury suffered by a victim who has received abusive 
comments online is potentially heightened where the perpetrator is 
anonymous.119 The lack of identity limits the victim’s ability to take 
steps to prevent further abuse.120 For example, Weber and Pelfrey found 
that many teenagers who receive abusive online messages from peers 
confront them in person in order to reconcile.121 However, where the 
speaker is anonymous, this is not an option. 
 
Moreover, anonymity also empowers users to post messages in 
unrestrained ways, 122  and avoid being held accountable for harm 
caused.123 Behind ‘a mask of namelessness’, speakers are willing to say 
more than they would say face-to-face.124 This increased freedom that 
anonymity provides reduces an individual’s inhibitions, separating their 
identity from their actions. 125  Therefore, anonymity increases the 
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likelihood of harmful comments being posted on social media. The CPS 
Guidelines should encourage the prosecution of those who use 
anonymity to harm others.  
5.2! Physical detachment between speakers and their 
audience 
Communicating online allows people to distance themselves from 
reality. People can show a side of themselves that they would not feel 
comfortable doing offline.126  The physical detachment attributed to 
online communication is also a cause for concern, as it removes the 
possibility of physically avoiding harmful communications. Online 
communication can be sent at any time and received any place,127 and 
so harmful comments posted online can penetrate the safety of the 
home, meaning there is no escape. 128  
 
The physical detachment between speakers and their audience can also 
be problematic because the sender cannot observe the true extent of the 
harm caused.129  Physical cues such as crying are not visible to the 
online communicator, 130  potentially causing them to unknowingly 
inflict genuine harm.131 
 
Furthermore, the fact that the recipient cannot hear the speaker’s tone 
of voice means that misinterpretations are likely to occur. 132  For 
example, a comment calling someone a ‘fat cow’ could be taken 
seriously and in extreme cases, could even lead to an eating disorder, 
which may not have been the speaker’s intention. It is noted that where 
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comments are intended to be a joke, prosecution should not be 
permitted. However, where a comment is sent with the intention of 
causing harm, but not the level of harm actually caused, the CPS 
Guidelines should permit the sender’s prosecution.  
5.3! Audience 
The increasing popularity of social networking sites means that 
comments posted online have the potential to be viewed by a 
significantly larger audience compared to face-to-face 
communication. 133  Online expression can come to the attention of 
people beyond the speaker’s intended audience. For example, in 2012 
Daniel Thomas posted a homophobic message about Olympic diver 
Tom Daley. It had only been intended to be seen by his Twitter 
followers, but instead reached millions, including Tom Daley 
himself.134 This instance demonstrates how, online, speakers cannot 
control the audience of their comments. The CPS refused to prosecute 
this case on the basis that, inter alia, the post was intended to be viewed 
by family and friends only.135 However, it is contended that speakers 
should not be able to avoid prosecution simply because their comment 
reached a wider audience than intended. It is common knowledge that 
social media increases the potential for comments to reach far and wide, 
136 and this should not excuse the speaker for causing harm to another.  
 
If an online comment is viewed by a large audience, it is likely to 
significantly increase the risk and level of harm suffered by the victim. 
137 For instance, in 2014, a teenage boy committed suicide after a video 
of him masturbating in the school bathroom went viral. The video was 
seen by a wide audience, some of whom began to bully the victim. 138 
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This also exhibits how enabling a large amount of people to view online 
posts can amplify the harm caused as it widens the ‘pool of 
individuals’ 139  who might be willing to communicate abusive and 
harmful messages. It follows that the potential for a large audience 
makes online communications more harmful than face-to-face 
communication. The CPS Guidelines ought to enable prosecution, even 
when the post in question is viewed by an unintended audience.  
5.4! Instant and permanent 
Once a message has been sent or posted online, it is instantly and 
permanently available for all to see:140 ‘the internet never forgets’.141 
This can be injurious for victims of harmful communication because 
something that was private can become permanently public. 142 
Furthermore, Moore and others note that the permanency of online 
attacks enables a single incident to have repeated effects.143 Therefore, 
the permanency of online comments make them more harmful than 
face-to-face comments. Accordingly, the CPS Guidelines should 
encourage the prosecution of senders of harmful communications.  
 
As well as being permanent, the instantaneous nature of posting 
messages online can be harmful as it allows people to do so without a 
moment’s reflection. 144  This means that users are ‘no longer 
constrained by the sound of their own voice’,145  and make harmful 
comments they are unlikely to say to someone’s face. The CPS 
Guidelines should protect those who have been harmed by an unfiltered 
comment. 
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5.5! Why should the law protect users from these harms? 
Subject to the harm principle, criminal law should permit individuals to 
do as they wish unless their conduct harms others.146  Therefore, if 
harmful comments are posted online contrary to section 1 MCA or 
section 127 CA, it should follow that the sender be prosecuted. 
 
However, some argue that protection from certain harms should not be 
dealt with by law, but by individuals themselves. O’Rourke suggested 
that victims can simply choose to avoid what has been said.147  For 
example, online users could ‘log off and vanish,’ avoiding any further 
harm.148 However, this is a futile suggestion for two reasons. Firstly, in 
this digital age, online presence has become a vital form of social 
interaction.149 Victims could end up feeling as though they are the ones 
being punished, especially children and young adults.150 It is unrealistic 
to assume that people can just avoid using it. Secondly, as Stevens J 
stated in a US case regarding offensive language on the radio: 
 
to say that one may avoid further offence by turning off the 
radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the 
remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow.151 
 
Therefore, regarding social media, simply logging off is unlikely to 
protect the victim because harm has already been caused.  
 
It is also arguable that, as opposed to logging off, one could block the 
perpetrator on social media or report them to the social networking site. 
However, this is also not always effective. The blocked person may be 
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able to contact the victim via other social media platforms, or they could 
create a new account which has not been blocked and continue to send 
harmful messages. 152  It follows that harm caused on social media 
should not be dealt with entirely by the individuals themselves; rather, 
there should be scope for them to be dealt with by the law. 
 
Some argue that prosecution is not a proportionate response to dealing 
with online communication. 153  However this article disagrees. 
Regarding the award of damages for libel cases, Barendt argued that 
damages act as a deterrent, causing people to ‘be careful about the terms 
in which they speak [online]’.154 It is submitted that, similarly, the threat 
of prosecution would also have deterrent effects on harmful online 
comments. Also, under section 1 MCA and section 127 CA, the 
sentences available do not exceed two years’ or six months’ 
imprisonment respectively. These punishments are relatively low,155 
and thus should not be deemed disproportionate to the harm suffered by 
victims of online abuse.  
 
Despite Rowbottom’s contention that low-level speech should under no 
circumstances be criminalised in light of the need to protect freedom of 
expression,156 it is argued that the Article 10 right should not apply to 
harmful expression. Though the fundamentality of the right to freedom 
of expression is accepted, the CPS should take more seriously the harm 
that comments on social media can cause.  
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6! Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the CPS Guidelines for prosecuting cases 
under section 1 MCA or section 127 CA does not strike the right 
balance between freedom of expression and protection from harm. Too 
much protection has been afforded to freedom of expression at the risk 
of many harmful communications going unchallenged.  
 
It has been contended that the CPS justifications for the current 
prosecution thresholds are unconvincing. To complain that a lower 
threshold would lead to a floodgate of trivial cases is a weak argument; 
it ignores the fact that online expression has the potential to cause actual 
harm, and the need to consider the merit of individual cases. To 
maintain that a lower threshold would have a chilling effect on speech 
is also unconvincing. Other areas of law have taken a more stringent 
approach to speech that is perceived as harmful. With the majority of 
people now online, it ought to be considered a matter of public interest 
to prosecute. Furthermore, the age of criminal responsibility in England 
and Wales is 10 and so any differential approach to prosecuting 
defendants according to their age must be underpinned by a clearer 
rationale. 
 
The justifications offered by the CPS for the high threshold give too 
much weight to freedom of expression, which this article argues is 
wrong. This article has acknowledged the fundamentality of freedom of 
expression as a human right. It benefits both individuals and society at 
large; it encourages self-development by improving knowledge and 
education and by allowing individuals to express their personalities. 
Furthermore, freedom of expression is both a necessary and desirable 
component of living in a democratic society. Nonetheless, these 
benefits derived from freedom of expression should not be associated 
with low-level comments posted online with the intention of harm to 
others. An online comment should not be protected if it has harmed 
another simply because it is true. Furthermore, low-level speech should 
not be protected by the democracy argument because that is more 
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closely related to high-level political speech that is in the public interest.  
 
Instead of protecting low-level speech that causes harm, the CPS 
Guidelines should shift the balance in favour of protecting victims from 
harm online. The unique characteristics of social media – namely 
anonymity, the physical detachment of the online world, the size of the 
audience, and the instant and permanent nature of online posting – give 
it the power to amplify the harm caused to recipients. Legal remedies 
should be available to those harmed online – logging off is not a 
panacea.  
